2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

27 April 2005
English
Original: Spanish

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Implementation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty pursuant to the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference with particular reference to the 13 practical steps

Report submitted by Argentina

Step 1

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Argentina was one of the 44 States whose ratification ensured the entry into force of the Treaty (art. XIV); as an original signatory, it ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 4 December 1998.

Argentina signed in December 1999 and ratified in February 2004 an agreement on the International Monitoring System under CTBT with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Thus, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, Argentina is actively involved in the establishment of an international monitoring system and has established on its territory a laboratory and eight stations (two infrasound; three seismological; three radionuclide) as part of the monitoring network.

Step 2

A moratorium on nuclear-weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

While Argentina is of the opinion that, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty step 2 is in principle expected of nuclear-weapon States, such step would take on special relevance pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Argentina also considers that nuclear-weapon-free zones make a significant contribution to international peace and security by closing them off to the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Argentina is a party to the first

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nuclear-weapon-free zone, the forward-looking Tlatelolco Treaty (1967), established in one of the most densely populated regions of the planet.

Step 3

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

In the Disarmament Conference, Argentina is a strong advocate for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty. In that regard, over the past 10 years, it has called for the negotiation of a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable" treaty in accordance with the Shannon mandate.

While Argentina considers that verification is not only a fundamental component of any disarmament and non-proliferation agreements but is also at the core of such agreements, it would advocate making progress in the area of nuclear disarmament, thus avoiding sterile discussions. Argentina calls for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty without conditions.

Step 4

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

Argentina favours establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, which would help to advance the issues that Argentina would like the Conference on Disarmament to address pursuant to Article VI.

Step 5

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

Argentina considers that the nuclear-weapon States that adopt nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control and reduction measures should comply with the principle of irreversibility. Argentina hopes that such principle will be explicitly included in all the bilateral and multilateral instruments that are negotiated pursuant to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; clearly, this is vital for the credibility of such arrangements.

Step 6

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

This critical step enabled agreement to be reached at the 2000 Review Conference. The unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to disarm should be complied with. Argentina would like to see concrete steps taken towards that end.

Step 7

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

Argentina welcomed the entry into force in June 2003 of the Moscow Treaty signed between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and is convinced that it is a positive contribution to nuclear weapons reduction. Furthermore, as indicated under step 5 of the Final Document, Argentina recalls the need to ensure that such new efforts include measures that are consistent with the principle of irreversibility.

Argentina is concerned by the lack of progress under the START treaties, which provide for the dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. In light of the June 2002 statement by the Russian Federation de-linking START II and tying the conclusion of negotiations on START III to the entry into force of START II, Argentina proposes that, in order to maintain the momentum achieved under START, the parties should consider, as a minimum, extending START I until 2009.

Moreover, Argentina considers the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty vital for strategic stability and international security; it therefore deplored the denunciation of the Treaty by the United States of America in December 2001.

Step 8

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Argentina supports the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and looks forward to the completion of such instrument through agreement among the parties on the IAEA excess weapon origin fissile material verification system, including the irreversible elimination of such material.

Step 9

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- **Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;**
- **Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;**
- **The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;**
- **Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;**
- **A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;**
- **The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.**

Argentina endorses these proposed steps. It is concerned in particular about the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, a concept which covers non-strategic nuclear weapons or the development of advanced technologies that make it possible to use improved versions of nuclear weapons (in terms of size and deployment) in conventional scenarios. Argentina deplores the formulation of new security doctrines that do not rule out the use of nuclear weapons.

Step 10

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

Argentina reminds nuclear-weapon States of the need to agree among themselves and to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material for non-military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements, to ensure that such material is not used in military programmes.

Step 11

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Argentina is an active participant in all international disarmament and non-proliferation forums, regimes and instruments dealing with both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.

Argentina's external policy in the areas of security, disarmament and non-proliferation is shaped by an integration strategy based on the establishment of confidence-building and transparent regional and global agreements.

Argentina rejects any arguments that make progress in nuclear disarmament contingent upon progress in conventional weapons. As Argentina has stated over the years at all relevant forums, it cherishes the hope that nuclear-weapon States will undertake negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith.

Step 12

Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

This report clearly demonstrates Argentina's commitment to the principle of submitting periodic reports under Article VI within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

Step 13

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Argentina is convinced that since verification has proved to be a crucial tool of the nuclear non-proliferation regime — by verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes of States signatories to the Treaty — the required verification of future commitments by nuclear-weapon States within the context of disarmament will further the achievement of the principle of irreversibility and address objections to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation measures.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

26 April 2005
English
Original: Spanish

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of paragraph 4 (c) of the decision of 1995 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by Spain

1. In accordance with paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the chapter concerning article VI in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the Government of the Kingdom of Spain is reporting on the steps it has taken to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Step 1
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

2. Spain fully supports the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It was among the first States to ratify the treaty and actively supports the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Both as an individual State and as a member of the European Union, Spain is engaged in a number of diplomatic initiatives with third States aimed at promoting the universality and entry into force of the Treaty. One of the monitoring stations of the International Monitoring System administered by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission is located in Spain, which defrays part of the station's operating costs.

Step 2
Moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing

3. Pending the universal ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the moratoria on nuclear-weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent an important contribution to international peace and security. Spain is working to ensure that nuclear-weapon States honour and

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strengthen their existing commitments regarding moratoria on nuclear-weapons testing.

Step 3
Negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material

4. Spain has supported various initiatives for the adoption of a programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and believes that negotiations should recommence immediately, in that Conference, on an international treaty establishing limitations and controls on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons: more specifically, those negotiations should contemplate the banning of the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Pending such an agreement, and even though they are not in themselves adequate, Spain welcomes the moratoria on the production of fissile material declared by nuclear-weapon States (or States possessing nuclear technology in general). At the appropriate time, another, related issue should also be taken into consideration: the treatment of existing stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Spain has supported the holding of seminars on these issues, organized on an informal basis in Geneva by the delegation of the Netherlands, and has participated in those seminars.

Step 4
Nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament

5. Among the issues that the Conference on Disarmament should be in a position to consider, on a priority basis, is the issue of nuclear disarmament. Spain believes that an ad hoc body should be established to give due attention to this issue.

Step 5
Irreversibility

6. Spain believes that the principle of irreversibility should be considered as an essential principle of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The credibility of bilateral and multilateral agreements on disarmament and arms control depends very strongly on their irreversibility. Spain calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to reflect the concept of irreversibility in their agreements on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Step 6
Unequivocal undertaking

7. The undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, referred to in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in the documents of the 2000 Review Conference, is an extremely important goal. Spain welcomes the measures adopted to reduce nuclear arsenals and urges all nuclear-weapon States to pursue their efforts to honour this undertaking.

Step 7
The START negotiations and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

8. The international community cannot ignore the bilateral actions taken on disarmament and arms control or their evolution over time. Bilateral disarmament and arms control measures also make a significant contribution to international peace and security. Transparency, irreversibility and verification are important elements within the bilateral framework, as they are within the multilateral framework. Spain has noted the denunciation by the United States of America of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the establishment by the United States and the Russian Federation of a new strategic framework in consequence of the Moscow Treaty, and it trusts that progress can be made both in the reduction of nuclear arsenals and in the areas of verification, transparency and irreversibility.

Step 8
Trilateral Initiative

9. Spain urges the United States of America and the Russian Federation to pursue and to step up negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Trilateral Initiative, in order that an agreement between the three parties can be reached, as soon as possible, on the system for verification by the IAEA of fissile material declared surplus to requirements, including its irreversible destruction.

Step 9
Steps by nuclear-weapon States

10. Like the large majority of States that make up the international community, Spain believes that nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to honour their commitments relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this regard, the importance of transparency, verification and irreversibility must be re-emphasized. Nuclear-weapon States should also submit regular reports on their arsenals, delivery systems, fissile-material stocks, and exports of technology for military use. Although it must be recognized that some nuclear-weapon States have shown considerable proof of transparency, it should be borne in mind that any confidence-building measure and any progress made in this area is of particular importance and urgency. More specifically, one cannot ignore the risk that weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorist organizations. This leads to the realization that non-nuclear weapon States also have important responsibilities with respect to verification and transparency: in this regard, it is essential inter alia to strengthen the role played by IAEA. All States should participate in the IAEA safeguards system, including the Additional Protocol and, ultimately, in the new concept of comprehensive safeguards or in other developments of the system.

11. Spain also welcomes the adoption last year of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which Spain actively helped to negotiate. Spain helped to sponsor this resolution because it believes that there is an urgent need for action in order to fill a

vacuum in international law relating to the need to prevent terrorist organizations and other entities from accessing weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. Spain calls on all States to adopt the national legislative and administrative measures provided for in the resolution.

Step 10
Arrangements by nuclear-weapon States concerning fissile material

12. Spain calls on all nuclear-weapon States to adopt or strengthen unilateral measures for the reduction of nuclear arsenals and to take appropriate measures concerning fissile material for military use declared to be surplus to requirements, especially its elimination, in accordance with the appropriate verification systems.

Step 11
General and complete disarmament

13. Spain participates actively in all international forums and agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation relating to conventional arsenals and weapons of mass destruction, thereby fully assuming political, legal and financial commitments. Spain is also a member of export-control regimes: close international cooperation in such regimes is an entirely legitimate and necessary complement to the general disarmament and non-proliferation system.

Step 12
Submission of reports

14. Spain fully supports the principle of submitting regular national reports within the framework of the Treaty review process.

Step 13
Development of verification capabilities

15. Spain believes that verification agreements and systems are an essential part of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. In general terms, measures that contribute towards transparency, verification and confidence-building are an essential part of the international community's efforts towards the "achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world".

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

28 April 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Australia

1. Australia fully supports the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Australia has joined the consensus every year at the United Nations General Assembly in support of the resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East freely arrived at among States of the region.

2. In the context of Australia's support for universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Australia calls on Israel, as for other States yet to join the Treaty, to accede to it as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

3. The Additional Protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards offers Middle East States an important confidence-building opportunity. Australia welcomes the implementation on a provisional basis of additional protocols by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and looks forward to their ratification. Australia will continue to urge conclusion by Middle East States of the Additional Protocol without delay or precondition.

4. Australia has joined with other IAEA Board members in urging Iran to resolve the continuing international concerns about its nuclear programme. Iran must urgently cooperate fully with IAEA to resolve outstanding questions, as must States, entities and persons that have supplied Iran's nuclear programme.

5. Australia welcomed Libya's historic decision in December 2003 to eliminate verifiably all materials, equipment and programmes leading to the production of nuclear weapons. Libya's actions stand as a prominent example of the benefits available to States that embrace transparency and commit to compliance with the highest nuclear non-proliferation standards.

6. While countries of the Middle East would need to take the initiative in developing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, membership of and adherence to existing treaties and instruments would be a step towards this aim. Australia contributes to the goal of such a zone through

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its efforts to achieve universal membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and our active support for the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, adopted in The Hague.

7. Australia is active in efforts to achieve universal application of nuclear safeguards measures — in the Middle East and elsewhere.

8. Australia fully supports the Middle East peace process and welcomes the good progress that has recently been made on this issue. The best prospect for such a peace remains a two-State solution that will ensure Israel's security and provide for a viable and stable Palestinian State. Australia has consistently urged both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map to Middle East peace, which still offers the most practical way forward in achieving this objective. We have been encouraged by the renewed efforts of the Palestinian Authority to stop terrorism, and by Israel's commitment to withdraw from Gaza.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

28 April 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament"

Report submitted by Australia

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains essential to international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitate access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and advance nuclear disarmament. The current intense international concern about weapons of mass destruction proliferation, including potentially to non-State groups, has added to the importance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty. Universality remains a key objective. Australia calls upon the three countries yet to join — India, Israel and Pakistan — to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States.

2. As a non-nuclear weapon State, the main contribution by Australia to nuclear disarmament is working for progress on the reinforcing steps essential to create an environment favourable to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. Australia believes that the article VI goal of nuclear disarmament can be achieved only through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps — including nuclear warhead reductions, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, further progress on nuclear weapon-free zones, and a strong and effective nuclear non-proliferation regime.

4. The Moscow Treaty, which entered into force on 1 June 2003, is a notable further step towards nuclear disarmament. The significance of the Moscow Treaty lies not just in its quantitative reductions but also in its ushering in of a more cooperative arms control relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. Australia hopes both countries will take advantage of the opportunities provided by that approach to pursue progressive reductions to strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons in both deployed and reserve holdings. We also look to the nuclear weapon States to pursue further reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapon systems in ways that promote international stability and security.

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

5. At the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Australia was an original co-sponsor of the nuclear disarmament resolution "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which emphasized the central importance of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the implementation of commitments in respect of article VI of the Treaty.

6. Australia strongly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and continues to make representations to countries yet to sign or ratify, especially Annex 2 countries and those in the Asia-Pacific region, urging their early signature and/or ratification of the Treaty. Australia, Mexico and New Zealand formed the core group that put forward the resolution on the Treaty adopted at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly. With Finland, Japan and the Netherlands, Australia convened at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly a joint ministerial meeting on the Treaty which underscored the continued widespread support for the Treaty. Australia has been appointed the Treaty article XIV coordinator for 2005-2006 and President-designate of the 2005 article XIV Conference on ways to accelerate the entry into force of the Treaty.

7. Australia is an active participant in development of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty International Monitoring System (IMS) and welcomes the continued progress being made on the System. Australia will host the third highest number of IMS stations (after the United States of America and the Russian Federation).

8. The fissile material cut-off treaty remains a priority for Australia. Australia continues to press for a start to negotiations for such a treaty. Australia is also active in promoting examination of issues that will arise in those negotiations. The position of Australia is that to be credible and effective the treaty should include measures to verify parties are complying with their obligations.

9. Effective non-proliferation is essential for a climate conducive to nuclear disarmament. Recent events have highlighted a clear and urgent need to strengthen the Treaty's compliance and verification mechanisms.

10. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are not static and have undergone considerable evolution since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 1970. The Additional Protocol and the development of strengthened and integrated safeguards are the most recent manifestation of that. Australia played a prominent role in negotiation of the Additional Protocol and was the first country to ratify such a Protocol.

11. Australia is of the firm view that the Additional Protocol together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement is the current verification standard pursuant to article III.1 of the Treaty, and believes the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should take a decision to that effect. Australia considers that integrated IAEA safeguards are essential to the effective and cost-effective implementation of strengthened safeguards.

12. The risk of misuse by States parties to the Treaty of its peaceful nuclear energy provisions in order to acquire the technical basis for a rapid breakout to nuclear weapons is a serious matter for the international community. Australia strongly supports the current extensive dialogue in relevant international forums on steps that would limit the spread of sensitive technology while respecting the rights of parties

to the Treaty to peaceful nuclear energy in conformity with the non-proliferation provisions under articles I, II and III.

Outreach and regional assistance

13. Australia is stepping up its regional outreach efforts. As part of those efforts, Australia is conducting outreach to regional countries on agreements such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Additional Protocol. Australia is also working with regional countries on practically based outreach in key areas such as export controls, nuclear security and safeguards training.

14. A major initiative under the Australian regional outreach programme was hosting of the Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security Conference in Sydney on 8 November 2004. In addition to regional ministers and their representatives, the conference was attended by the Director General of the IAEA.

15. The meeting recognized that a strong nuclear safeguards and security framework was essential to realizing the benefits of peaceful use of nuclear energy. It noted that effective nuclear safeguards and security measures were vital not only for countries with nuclear power programmes or research reactors, but also for those where radioactive materials are used for medical, industrial and scientific purposes. Participants agreed to work together in a sustained and comprehensive effort to expand and enhance the nuclear safeguards and security framework. The outcomes statement from the conference has been circulated as document NPT/CONF.2005/2.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

28 April 2005
English
Original: French

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Morocco

I. Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

1. The new international security situation resulting from the events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated the enormous importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the need to preserve its strength and credibility in order to confront the threats associated with nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

2. In this context, the Kingdom of Morocco believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a key instrument for the maintenance of peace and security in the world. It has therefore always supported initiatives aimed at strengthening the authority of this regime and promoting its universality.

3. The Kingdom of Morocco stresses the crucial importance of respect by all States Parties for the provisions of the Treaty and the obligations arising from it.

4. For its part, the Kingdom of Morocco, which has signed and ratified all the multilateral instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, remains committed to general and complete disarmament and in particular to nuclear disarmament. Since its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, the Kingdom of Morocco has constantly worked for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation.

5. Moreover, as a Contracting Party, the Kingdom of Morocco has consistently supported the decisions aimed at strengthening the review process of the Treaty.

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6. For this reason, the Kingdom of Morocco fully supports the positive conclusions of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirms the importance of their implementation by the States Parties, in a transparent, balanced and irreversible manner.

7. It believes that the multilateral non-proliferation regime must be strengthened in order to combat the illicit proliferation of nuclear devices and material and the risks of nuclear terrorism.

8. Likewise, at the level of the General Assembly, the Kingdom of Morocco has always supported the adoption of resolutions aimed at promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

9. The Kingdom of Morocco endorses action aimed at ending the deadlock in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and continues to support the undertaking of negotiations for the formulation of a treaty on fissile material, a legal instrument on negative security assurances and a convention on nuclear disarmament.

10. The Kingdom of Morocco reaffirms its commitment to the inalienable right of the States Parties to the Treaty to carry out research, and develop the production and utilization of nuclear energy and technologies for peaceful purposes, particularly through international cooperation under monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

11. The Kingdom of Morocco, which supports a total ban on nuclear tests, has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It deplores the fact that this Treaty, which was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, has still not entered into force. In this respect, it reiterates its appeal to all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay. It stresses the importance of respect for the moratoriums on nuclear tests and of the convening of conferences in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty.

12. In addition, in implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Kingdom of Morocco concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA as of 1973. On 22 September 2004, it concluded an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency, pursuant to the Treaty.

13. The Kingdom of Morocco has also ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It has also notified the Director General of IAEA of its acceptance of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

14. The Kingdom of Morocco believes that appropriate security measures should be established for nuclear installations and is in favour of strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

15. The efforts made by the Kingdom of Morocco to supplement its legal arsenal for combating the proliferation of and trafficking in devices and material that could help non-State actors to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop or transport nuclear, biological or chemical weapons demonstrate the Kingdom's unshakeable commitment to the campaign waged by the international community to confront terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

16. A standing committee for nuclear monitoring, established by royal decree in January 2001 and attached to the office of the Prime Minister, has been charged,

inter alia, with preparing a homogeneous and unified draft law on nuclear and radiological safety and security and on the establishment of a safety authority to be charged with ensuring tight control over nuclear material and radioactive sources, keeping an inventory of them and applying safety and security measures in accordance with national legislation and basic international standards. This draft law, elaborated in collaboration with IAEA experts, has been submitted to the competent authorities within the framework of the constitutional process for adoption.

17. Other draft regulations pertaining to transport safety and waste management are in the process of being finalized. The draft law on civil liability in case of nuclear damage, meanwhile, was adopted on 20 January 2005.

18. Moreover, a draft joint decree on the physical protection of nuclear material is being elaborated. This text, conceived in the form of a regulation, complies with the provisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

19. The Kingdom of Morocco, being profoundly convinced that the international effort to combat terrorism should cover all aspects of that complex phenomenon, fully shares the concerns of the international community concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, on 26 October 2004, it submitted its national report pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

20. The Kingdom of Morocco welcomes the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism by the General Assembly as a significant step forward in the international struggle against international terrorism in all its forms.

II. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

1. The Kingdom of Morocco remains convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones helps strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For that reason, it has always supported the establishment of such zones where they do not exist.

2. The Kingdom of Morocco was one of the first countries to call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, because it believes that the existence of such a zone is not only a necessary measure to banish proliferation and insecurity in this region, but also an international objective and a factor in the consolidation of peace and security in the world.

3. At the level of the League of Arab States, Morocco is participating in the development of a legal and technical mechanism for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

4. Within IAEA, the Kingdom of Morocco is taking active steps to promote the application of the Agency's safeguards regime throughout the Middle East region, because it believes that this is an essential international security measure.

5. The Kingdom of Morocco encourages the conclusion by all States of the Middle East region, including Israel, of comprehensive safeguards agreements with

IAEA, as an important step towards the creation of a climate of trust between the States of the region and a preliminary measure for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. The Kingdom of Morocco has helped promote confidence-building measures among the States that are parties to the conflict in the Middle East, particularly by participating in the work of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.

7. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East requires that the only State of the region — Israel — that is not yet a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should accede to it and submit its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards regime. This concern was specifically mentioned in the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

8. Morocco stresses the need for all the parties concerned to take concrete measures, as a matter of urgency, for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region and, pending the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly their intention to refrain, on the basis of reciprocity, from manufacturing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and not to allow the emplacement of nuclear weapons in their territories by any third party.

9. The Kingdom of Morocco is conducting sustained action, at both the regional and the international levels, to encourage all the States of the region to undertake the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

10. The Kingdom of Morocco constantly reiterates its appeal to the nuclear Powers, and particularly to the depositaries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the international community and to international organizations to assume their respective responsibilities for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.